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1. Introduction 
Price developments in small open economies are often significantly influenced by factors beyond the 
reach of monetary policy. These factors include food and energy prices, and capital flows, which can 
have a large impact on the exchange rate. Transition economies which have achieved macroeconomic 
stability, and liberalised capital flows and financial markets, have usually faced increased inflows of 
FDI (as they transform from extensive state ownership to private ownership), and to a lesser extent 
debt capital (as their nominal interest rates are higher than in the advanced economies). These inflows 
pose a dilemma. On the one hand, they enable faster development and integration with the advanced 
economies. On the other hand, they lead to strong appreciation pressures which, while contributing to 
disinflation pressures in the short run, may lead to a loss of competitiveness, growing external 
imbalance and, ultimately, depreciation and higher inflation. 
Given the large impact of exchange rate fluctuations in small open economies, a fixed exchange rate 
regime was traditionally thought to be appropriate. However, liberalisation and globalisation have 
rendered fixed exchange rate regimes vulnerable to speculative pressures, which may make them 
very costly to sustain. For this reason, many countries now employ more flexible exchange rate 
regimes. 
Where capital inflows are predominantly equity rather than debt, they may be fairly insensitive to 
interest rate fluctuations. Central banks therefore often intervene in the foreign exchange market to 
affect exchange rate fluctuations. However, as doubts exist as to the long-term effects of such 
interventions, central banks also apply non-standard instruments, such as the “privatisation account” in 
the Czech Republic. 
The rest of this paper describes in more detail how globalisation and capital inflows have influenced 
monetary policy in the Czech Republic. Sections 2 and 3 summarise experiences in periods of strong 
debt and equity inflows respectively. The fourth section deals with a package of measures used by the 
Czech National Bank (CNB), following an agreement with the government, to curb the subsequent 
appreciation pressures. Section 5 looks ahead to the interaction of capital flows, the exchange rate 
and monetary policy following the accession of the Czech Republic to the euro area. Section 6 
concludes with a summary of the CNB’s experiences of managing monetary policy in the face of 
strong capital inflows. 
2.  The CNB’s monetary policy during strong debt capital inflows 
The CNB and its predecessor were aware of the significant influence of the exchange rate on prices in 
a small open economy, and therefore used a fixed exchange rate as the nominal anchor from the 
beginning of the reform period (January 1991). Selection of a reliable nominal anchor was especially 
important given the massive price liberalisation and the transitional nature of the Czech economy, 
which foreboded many internal shocks. In addition to the exchange rate, there was targeting of 
monetary aggregates (first the total volume of credit and soon after the M2 money supply). The 
strategy of targeting two, potentially controversial, nominal variables proved effective initially as capital 
inflows were not excessive. As macroeconomic stabilisation gradually dispelled the distrust of foreign 
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investors and financial markets became less regulated and more liquid, from the second half of 1994, 
capital inflows strengthened and it became increasingly difficult to achieve the dual targets. 
As Table 1 shows, initially (until 1996) private debt capital inflows were prevalent, benefiting from the 
positive interest rate differential and the low exchange rate risk in the fixed exchange rate regime. 
Larger and well-established domestic corporations and foreign-owned companies acquired cheaper 
credit directly abroad, while smaller and less known companies turned to domestic banks for credit. 
Domestic banks drew money from abroad and onlent it to these companies. The attractiveness of 
Czech koruna investment also increased foreign investment in the money market and, to a lesser 
degree, also capital market instruments. The inflow of capacity-creating FDI grew at a markedly slower 
rate in this period, partly due to the absence of investment incentives. There were only relatively minor 
sales of state property to foreign concerns, apart from the privatisation of when SPT Telecom in 1995. 
The inflow of capital into the stock market trended down over time due to the poor transparency and 
lack of credibility. 
 
Table 1 
Long-term structure of capital 
inflows to the Czech Republic 
In billions of CZK 
  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Total    88    97   218   114    34    94   107   191   173   367 
Foreign direct investment    16    22    67    35    41   116   216   191   208   296 
Sales of state 
property 
  9    4   37    1    1    4   40   35   61    126 
Reinvested  profits              6   24   37   58   89 
Equities   26   13   24   15   14   39    –45    –20   37    –17 
Debt capital    46    63   127    64   –20   –60   –65    21   –72    88 
State institutions    1    –2    –6    –16   –4    –11   –2   –7   11   29 
 
The inflow of capital enabled a faster move to convertibility of the Czech koruna: initially internally,
2 
and in 1995 externally, for operations on the balance of payments current account and some 
operations on the financial account. These steps, as well as the growing current account deficit, 
absorbed part of the capital inflows. But as they increased even further, the CNB had to withdraw the 
surplus foreign exchange from the market in order to keep the exchange rate within the narrow 
fluctuation band (±0.5%). In doing this, however, it issued new korunas, which had to be sterilised 
later, so that it could fulfil the M2 target.
3 This sterilisation in turn pushed up interest rates, which 
stimulated additional debt capital inflow that had to be withdrawn from the market … and the whole 
cycle started again. Monetary policy based on the targeting of two nominal variables in conditions of 
mostly liberalised capital flows was falling deeper and deeper into the sterilisation trap, leaving less 
and less space for managing the accelerating domestic demand. Indeed, the two intermediate targets 
were eroding the effectiveness of monetary policy. (By contrast, the implementation of monetary policy 
has been broadly consistent with the approach employed by most advanced central banks; Box 1.) 
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The CNB tried to neutralise part of the capital inflows by prepaying all loans from the IMF, having the 
government transfer privatisation proceeds from commercial banks to it, shifting from clearing to a 
convertible-currency payment system with Slovakia, introducing more stringent rules for foreign 
exchange transactions with its clients and, for a time, limiting short-term open positions of banks with 
non-residents.
4 Also considered at this time, and allowed for in the new Foreign Exchange Act, was 
requiring a proportion of funds borrowed from abroad to be placed in an interest-free account with the 
CNB. However, as this idea was not supported by the OECD or other international institutions, it was 
not introduced. The CNB also tried to slow the money supply, without pushing up interest rates, by 
increasing required reserve ratios, but this strategy was limited by concerns about the impact of this 
implicit taxation of the financial performance of banks. 
Box 1 
Monetary policy in the Czech Republic since the mid-1990s 
The CNB’s monetary policy has been implemented in an environment of surplus liquidity. Regular repo 
tenders have been used to set broad liquidity in the banking sector. Their maturity has varied. Initially it was 
one to two weeks; in early 1997 one year was added, from 1998 only two weeks and three months were 
used, and now only two-week repos are employed. The declared repo rate, which serves as the maximum at 
which banks’ bids can be satisfied in the tender, has been the key monetary policy rate. Fine-tuning 
instruments (securities and/or foreign exchange operations) have been used only rarely, to smooth the effects 
on interest rates of unexpected liquidity fluctuations in the market. 
There were no automatic facilities in the 1990s. The CNB used, at its discretion, “emergency” and “Lombard” 
credit facilities to help those central banks that faced short-term liquidity problems. The emergency credit 
facility was withdrawn in December 1995 and the Lombard facility was converted into a marginal lending 
facility in May 1997. The interest rate applied to the latter, the “Lombard rate”, provides a ceiling for short-term 
interest rates in the money market. The overnight deposit facility, introduced in December 1998, provides a 
corresponding floor. The spread between the Lombard and deposit rates had varied prior to 2001, as it was 
used to signal to the market concerns about future interest rates. Since then, the spread has been fixed at 
200 basis points, with the deposit rate 100 basis points below the repo rate and the Lombard rate 100 basis 
points above. 
The CNB has also used reserve requirements but, as in other countries, their importance has waned over 
time. In July 1997 the CNB started the process of aligning its own requirements with those of the ECB. The 
reserve ratio was therefore cut from 9.5% to 2% by 1999 and interest has been paid on required reserves 
since July 2001. 
The CNB used to intervene regularly in the foreign exchange market. However, following the enlargement of 
the fluctuation band in February 1996, intervention has been used only to smooth exchange rate volatility. 
Discounting of export bills and rediscounting of commercial bills were used until September 1997 to support 
exporters and small- or medium-sized businesses. 
These measures only slightly reduced capital inflows. In February 1996, the CNB decided to fight the 
accelerating inflow of debt capital by widening the exchange rate fluctuation band to ±7.5%. This 
increased the exchange rate risk, making the returns on koruna-denominated investments less 
attractive to foreign investors. Debt inflows approximately halved in 1996, but still exceeded the 
amount necessary for covering the current account deficit, leading to a 5.5% appreciation of the 
koruna (vis-à-vis the central parity of the existing currency basket: 65% DEM, 35% USD) by February 
1997. The CNB intervened only sporadically, as it did not want to generate any undesirable volatility of 
the exchange rate amid ongoing uncertainty regarding its equilibrium level. 
The appreciation accelerated disinflation (in May 1997, annual consumer price inflation fell to 6.3%), 
but on the other hand it reduced the competitiveness of domestic producers (both exporters and 
producers placing their products on the domestic market). At the same time, the demand side of the 
economy was overheated. Banks underestimated credit risk and lent readily despite weaknesses in 
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the legal environment. The two-pronged monetary policy was not able to suppress the accelerating 
domestic demand and other fiscal and income policies did not provide adequate support.
5 
The insufficiently flexible domestic supply could not meet the accelerating domestic demand, which, in 
the context of a small open and liberalised economy, resulted in a growing external imbalance. From 
late 1996, the current account deficit fluctuated between 8% and 9% of GDP, markedly exceeding the 
generally accepted critical limit (5%). The growing gross external debt was approaching the safety limit 
of 40% of GDP. Exports began stagnating. These trends reduced foreign exchange reserves to the 
safety limit of three months’ coverage of imports of goods and services. There were also signs that 
dynamism was being lost on the microeconomic front. Privatisation of large banks was continuously 
postponed, price deregulation slowed down, restructuring of the corporate sector proceeded only very 
slowly, the capital market still lacked transparency, the exercise of ownership rights was poor, 
enforcement of the law was weak, and so forth. In April 1997, the government adopted measures 
aimed at reducing the fiscal deficit (the so-called first government package), but markets regarded 
them as insufficient. Against such a background, investors gradually came to believe that 
macroeconomic developments were unsustainable and expectations of depreciation intensified. 
Moreover, elements of instability in the domestic political situation and contagion from the currency 
crises in Southeast Asia also played a role in the emergence of exchange rate turbulence. 
The concurrence of the above factors resulted in strong pressures on the Czech koruna in May 1997. 
In this situation, the CNB was not able to defend the fixed exchange rate effectively despite a radical 
interest rate increase and massive intervention in the foreign exchange market. The CNB failed to 
protect the fixed exchange rate, but managed to handle the attack against the Czech koruna so that, 
compared to the currency shocks in some other countries, it resulted in only a modest depreciation of 
the exchange rate (by approximately 12% against the central parity of the currency basket). The fixed 
exchange rate was replaced by a managed floating regime. 
3.  Monetary policy during a period of strong equity capital inflows  
Higher inflationary expectations, coupled with the depreciation of the koruna, pushed inflation to 
almost 10% by August 1997 and over 13% in early 1998. While floating the currency gave more scope 
for an independent monetary policy, it became evident that there was no reliable relationship between 
the money supply and inflation. The money supply was unpredictably related to both the monetary 
base and inflation, and there were significant lags in the transmission mechanism. The lame results 
from money targeting led the CNB to switch to inflation targeting from January 1998. Inflation 
targeting, being more comprehensible, is more likely to anchor inflationary expectations. It can also 
adapt better to today’s fast-changing globalised world. 
The high inflation, the risk of continuing exchange rate depreciation, the persistent high inflation 
expectations, the more relaxed setting of macroeconomic policies, and the uncertainty regarding the 
early elections all hindered the pace of interest rate cuts. As a result of fiscal and monetary 
restrictions, together with other structural factors, economic growth faltered (GDP contracted in 1997, 
1998 and the first half of 1999). From the second half of 1998 until mid-1999, inflation fell rapidly due 
to the suppressed domestic demand, decreasing inflation expectations and positive supply shocks 
(low prices of raw materials, exchange rate appreciation). Given these developments, and their impact 
on inflation forecasts, the CNB rapidly cut interest rates. The key monetary policy interest rate 
(two-week repo rate) was cut in 13 steps from 15% to 6.5% during this period. Interest rates in the 
second half of 1999 were reduced more gradually (the repo rate was cut in five steps to 5.25%). A 
significant decrease of the interest rate differential resulted (in 1997, and particularly in 1998 and 
1999) in a net outflow of debt capital. Starting in 1998, however, the inflow of FDI rose sharply (see 
Table 1) - reflecting a unique concurrence of new investment incentives (capacity-creating FDI), 
privatisation of state property and sales of private property which some local owners could not keep 
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after the exchange rate turbulence. The inflow led to accelerating appreciation pressures in the 
second quarter of 1999 (see Graph 1). 
Graph 1 
Nominal exchange rate of the koruna 
against the euro and US dollar since 1999 
 
In this period, the CNB responded to the strengthening koruna by easing interest rates, in line with the 
forecasts of falling inflation, and attempted to dampen its excessive volatility by intervening in the 
foreign exchange market. These measures were accompanied by the use of the “privatisation 
account”, described in the following section. 
4.  Economic policies during increased capital inflow; the “privatisation 
account” 
In 1999, the government sold its holding in the ČSOB bank and converted the proceeds into korunas 
on the foreign exchange market, leading to a substantial appreciation. In addition, it decided to 
accelerate privatisation of other state-held assets worth approximately USD  8-9  billion, to be 
completed by 2003. It was expected that the assets would be sold mostly to non-residents, which 
would lead to a stronger inflow of capital. Excessive capital inflow would directly stimulate the growth 
of domestic demand and concurrently, through the exchange rate appreciation, slow down the growth 
of domestic supply, possibly causing greater external imbalances. This could, especially if economic 
growth was slow, alarm investors, which would subsequently result in a capital outflow followed by an 
inevitable exchange rate depreciation. The economy would therefore be exposed, in the medium term, 
to the risk of higher exchange rate volatility and of a steep depreciation, with adverse consequences 
for prices, monetary policy and overall economic development. At the end of 1999, the CNB and the 
government agreed on a joint strategy; see CNB (1999). 
The strategy document suggested that, given the growing domestic demand, a tighter fiscal and 
income policy would be necessary to avoid the CNB having to raise interest rates, which might 
stimulate debt capital inflows into the country, thus intensifying the appreciation trends. The monetary 
policy should, however, address the disequilibrium appreciation of the Czech koruna and suppress the 
exchange rate volatility. Aiming to reduce the appreciation pressures, the government agreed that until 
the end of 2000, it would refrain from issuing its bonds abroad. As non-debt capital is insensitive to 
interest rates, and interest rate policy was directed to the inflation target, interventions in the foreign 
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was supposed to be supported by the “privatisation account” used for depositing foreign exchange 
from the large sales of state property.
6 If these funds were drawn down, the CNB had to convert them 
into korunas by means of a direct purchase into its foreign exchange reserves. Keeping large foreign 
exchange volumes from entering the market (and moreover in waves and with irregular intervals) 
sought to dampen the short-term volatility of the exchange rate and assuage the strong appreciation 
expectations. The funds deposited in the privatisation account were to be used for repayment of debts 
from the transformation period (eg for consolidation and stabilisation of the banking sector), one-off 
transformation costs (eg the introduction of the planned new pension system) and costs related to 
ensuring compatibility with European Union legislation (environment, infrastructure, etc). Drawing on 
these funds was completely at the discretion of the government and the duty to spread it over a period 
of time was not included in the agreement. 
 
Table 2 
Use of the privatisation account 
Billions of koruna 
 2000  2001
1 2002 
Privatised state property  35  81  125 
Converted via privatisation account  20  40  125 
1  Includes CZK 20 billion from the unblocking of the Russian debt. 
 
The privatisation account was not fully used until 2002 (Table 2).
7 It was used for holding, and 
converting into korunas, only about half of the proceeds from sales of state property over the period. It 
therefore only assisted in suppressing appreciation pressures to a limited degree. The funds were 
generally in the account for several months, and the continuing appreciation of the koruna led to 
valuation losses. Moreover, the CNB was buying foreign exchange reserves at a higher price than if 
the privatisation proceeds had been sold on the market (at the markedly stronger exchange rate). The 
government was the real beneficiary of the privatisation account as it received more korunas for its 
foreign exchange. 
The strategy discussed in the previous section and the privatisation account proved to be an 
insufficient anchor for exchange rate expectations, causing a gradual decline in the effectiveness of 
interventions and assisting in the creation of the appreciation bubble. Excessive appreciation of the 
koruna at the end of 2001 and the beginning of 2002 came at a very unfortunate time, as monetary 
conditions were being tightened at a time when the Czech Republic’s principal trading partners (the 
EU states) were in recession. The growing deficit in the public finances also gave rise to concerns, 
and calls for the privatisation proceeds to cover some public spending at the earliest practicable time. 
To give a clear signal to the market that the proceeds from the state property privatisation would not in 
future be let onto the foreign exchange market, causing further appreciation of the koruna, the 
government and the CNB agreed, at the beginning of 2002, to cooperate in remedying the effects of 
the state’s increased foreign exchange revenues on the foreign exchange market; see CNB (2002). 
The approved procedure which followed up on the strategy is based on three types of measures: 
(a)  a stock-taking of all existing and potential foreign exchange commitments of the state. 
Specifically: 
•  the Ministry of Finance would not issue bonds denominated in foreign currency in 
2002 (later extended to include 2003); 
                                                       
6  The privatisation account was not used for proceeds from less important sales of state property, municipal, corporate and 
private property, capacity-creating FDI and privatisation proceeds denominated in korunas. 
7  The same was true of most other measures adopted under the strategy. The growing deficit in the public finances and the 
persistent pressure on the Ministry of Finance to allow government bonds to be issued abroad can be cited as examples. BIS Papers No 23  147
 
•  the ministries and selected state-owned institutions would, in cooperation with the 
Ministry of Finance and the CNB, provide for the settlement of their foreign currency 
commitments out of the proceeds from privatisation; 
•  National Property Fund proceeds which were earmarked for the payment of costs and 
losses of the Czech Consolidation Agency would not be converted in the foreign 
exchange market; 
•  foreign exchange commitments of the Czech and Moravian Development and 
Guarantee Bank would be given priority in conversion from Czech korunas to euros 
with the Czech Consolidation Agency; 
•  the Czech Export Bank would provide for its prospective foreign currency asset 
financing by transacting with the state; 
•  the Ministry of Finance would leave the funds from the unblocking of the Russian debt 
on the foreign exchange account with the CNB until at least 31 May 2002, and the 
conversion of these funds into Czech korunas would take place outside the foreign 
exchange market - by means of a direct purchase into the CNB’s foreign exchange 
reserves. 
(b)  ways of influencing the course of future privatisation transactions. It was agreed that all 
future negotiations with privatisation advisers and investors would be directed so that a part 
of the privatisation price was paid in Czech korunas using a Czech koruna-denominated 
loan. 
(c)  agreement that the CNB would purchase remaining privatisation revenues (and other foreign 
exchange) and place them directly in its foreign exchange reserves in cases where the state 
was unable to leave such revenues in the foreign exchange account with the central bank 
and a payment in Czech korunas proved impossible to agree with the investor. To eliminate 
or mitigate the CNB’s losses in connection with the sterilisation of these direct conversions, 
and to address any past unsettled relations between the government and the central bank, 
CZK 25 billion would be deposited in a non-interest-bearing foreign exchange account with 
the CNB and any remaining foreign exchange funds of the state (existing or acquired in the 
future) which would have to be converted into Czech korunas would be purchased directly 
from the state by the CNB, and added to its foreign exchange reserves. In order to partially 
compensate the CNB’s future losses ensuing from the sterilisation of additional foreign 
exchange reserves, the CNB would charge the state a fee for direct conversions of foreign 
exchange revenues, as per an agreed schedule.
8 
The key items of the revised strategy were implemented. The privatisation account was more 
consistently used (Table 2). However, it took more than six months to convince markets that the 
government and CNB would implement the strategy in a consistent manner. The excessive 
appreciation trend was halted in late September 2002. 
5.  Future interaction of capital flows, exchange rate and monetary policy 
Exchange rate movements and capital flows will have a major effect on domestic prices until the 
Czech Republic joins the euro area and adopts the single currency. Integration of the Czech Republic 
into European structures will no longer have any significant influence on “non-speculative” capital 
flows. Sales of state property will proceed according to the plans or needs of the government. 
However, due to the depletion of the state and private property for sale, future sales to non-residents 
are unlikely to cause the Czech koruna to appreciate. Capacity-creating FDI, as well as the inflow of 
capital into the stock market, will be only partially boosted by the EU accession. Inflow of capital into 
real estate will not be very notable. At present, these inflows are regulated by law only for non-resident 
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individuals, and moreover, with respect to the application of the exception at a maximum permitted 
length {unclear}, we cannot expect the situation to change in the medium term. On the contrary, we 
cannot exclude that in some areas, net capital outflows may take place as has occurred with shares 
since 1999 (Table 1).
9 
The EU accession and the subsequent convergence process will not create very favourable conditions 
for debt capital inflows. The scope for making koruna investment more attractive compared to euro-
denominated investment will be further narrowed by the convergence of interest rates with the euro 
area and by the relative stability of the exchange rate (in conditions which otherwise remain 
unchanged) as a result of the slower pace of its equilibrium appreciation. Competition from higher 
interest rates in most transition countries may also play a role. The trend of debt capital flows will be 
affected mostly by two phenomena. The first is the drawing on foreign resources by the public sector 
(by means of a growing volume of purchases of government bills and bonds by non-residents or 
potential issuance of government bonds abroad), which has been gradually increasing since 2001 
(Table 1). The second phenomenon is the potential flows of speculative debt capital in connection with 
so-called convergence plays. These speculations may occur both prior to the setting of the central 
parity before joining ERM2 and in the period before setting the conversion rate to the euro, ie before 
the setting of an irrevocably fixed exchange rate which will be applied to conversions of entities’ Czech 
koruna assets and liabilities to the euro. 
The efforts to limit the risk of exchange rate fluctuations as a result of convergence plays are one of 
the reasons why the CNB recommends participation in the ERM2 exchange rate mechanism for no 
longer than the required minimum period of two years. The ERM2 exchange rate mechanism is 
regarded merely as the gateway for joining the euro area and a prolonged membership of the 
mechanism is therefore not desirable. The Czech Republic should join ERM2 only after conditions 
have been established which enable it to introduce the euro at the time of the assessment of the 
exchange rate criterion (two years after joining the ERM 2) and to then benefit from its introduction 
without experiencing any problems. The time limitation, however, only partly reduces the risk of 
convergence plays. A more important factor is the minimisation of the scope for this type of 
speculation through a consistent defence against disequilibrium exchange rate development. Stable 
macroeconomic development (the goal of all macroeconomic policies) will play a major part, together 
with absorption of foreign exchange inflows from the sales of the remaining (still relatively great) 
volume of state property and the potential inflow of debt capital drawn by the state on foreign markets 
to finance the public finance deficit and public debt, through the privatisation account. 
Adopting the euro will significantly reduce the risk of exchange rate speculation. Potential speculation 
will focus only on the relation of the euro to major currencies outside the euro area. It will be the task 
of the ECB to counter any such speculation, although the CNB may be instructed by the ECB to assist 
in implementing the ECB’s responses. 
6. Conclusions 
The CNB’s experience in managing monetary policy during its relatively short history is in many ways 
identical to the experience of other central banks in small open economies, where the exchange rate 
and supply shocks significantly affect domestic prices. Unlike central banks in market economies, 
central banks in transition economies additionally experience problems in connection with the need for 
privatisation of vast state assets which, given the shortage of domestic capital, require the involvement 
of foreign capital on a great scale. A role is also played by the need to respond to many internal 
shocks, in particular in the early years of transformation, which may tempt central banks to opt for the 
the dual scheme of monetary policy management based on the fixed exchange rate and money supply 
targeting. The CNB’s experience demonstrates the failure of the dual system in a period of more and 
more liberalised capital flows and financial markets. A monetary policy attempting to target two 
nominal variables by means of a single instrument (interest rate) is caught in a vicious circle and is 
ineffective in managing domestic demand. The declining effectiveness of monetary policy is also due 
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to insufficient support from other macroeconomic policies. The inflexible domestic supply - typical for 
most transition economies - is not able to meet the accelerating domestic demand, resulting in 
external imbalances. If this is accompanied by other negative factors, such as problems in the banking 
sector or contagion, exchange rate turbulence or a currency crisis is very likely. 
The CNB’s experience also confirms that applying administrative instruments to limit capital inflows is 
not very effective, partly because ways of circumventing them are quickly found. A marked widening of 
the fluctuation band for exchange rate movements was also not an adequate solution. The substitution 
of the dual scheme of monetary policy management with targeting of the fixed exchange rate (though 
only in the form of a crawling band) is very vulnerable in the fast-changing globalised world of today. 
However, resorting to one of the autonomous schemes of monetary policy management, including 
inflation targeting, also carries a degree of risk, as the exchange rate, owing to its continuing major 
effect on prices, cannot be left out of consideration. 
Extraordinary shocks, such as big swings in non-debt capital or FDI inflows, call for extraordinary 
measures. But unless these are implemented with determination and in a credible manner, their 
effectiveness is relatively low. Following an agreement with the government, the CNB started to 
implement a set of measures aimed at suppressing the effects of capital inflows on the exchange rate 
(specifically the higher volatility and/or excessive appreciation of the Czech koruna). A major role was 
played by the privatisation account into which foreign currency acquired from large sales of state 
property had to be deposited. When these funds were withdrawn, the CNB was supposed to convert 
them into Czech korunas outside the foreign exchange market by purchasing them directly and 
transferring them to the foreign exchange reserves. The effectiveness of these measures increased 
only after their consistent application starting from 2002. However, it took more than six months before 
the excessive appreciation expectations were calmed. 
The development of the exchange rate and the capital flows will continue to affect price developments 
until the Czech Republic joins the euro area. The CNB’s analyses show that integration into the 
European structures may cause the exchange rate to fluctuate only as a result of convergence plays, 
namely speculations on the level of central parity within the ERM2 mechanism, and later on the 
conversion rate to be applied in converting Czech koruna assets and liabilities to euros. Also for this 
reason, the CNB, among other things, recommends participation in the ERM2 system only for the 
required minimum of two years. A more important challenge, however, is the prevention of a 
disequilibrium exchange rate development which establishes favourable conditions for convergence 
plays. Monetary policy and other macroeconomic policies should, first and foremost, provide for 
macroeconomic stability. This can be also bolstered by a consistent utilisation of the measures agreed 
with the government, and, within that framework, of the privatisation account. The account should 
absorb not only the proceeds from privatisation of the remaining state property, but also the inflow of 
debt capital drawn by the state institutions on foreign markets to cover the public finance deficit and 
the public debt. 
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